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Using the Term Structure




he term structure of interest rates, i.e., the yield curve, has long been of
interest to monetary policymakers and their advisers. The transmission
of monetary policy is conventionally viewed as running from short-
term interest rates managed by central banks to longer-term rates that inﬂuence
aggregate demand. A central bank’s leverage over longer-term rates comes from
the fact that the market determines these as the average expected level of short
rates over the relevant horizon (abstracting from a term premium and default
risk). Working in the other direction, the long bond rate contains a premium
for expected inﬂation and, thus, serves as an indicator of the credibility of a
central bank’s commitment to low inﬂation.1
Different theoretical perspectives support the two above-mentioned uses of
the term structure for monetary policy: John Hicks’s (1939) expectations theory
of the term structure supports the ﬁrst, and Irving Fisher’s (1896) decomposi-
tion of nominal bond rates into expected inﬂation and an expected real return
supports the second.2 The two views are compatible in principle, although
reconciling them creates difﬁculties of interpretation in practice. For example,
does a steepening yield curve indicate a loss of conﬁdence in the central bank’s
commitment to low inﬂation, or does it indicate that markets expect tighter
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policy in the form of a higher path of short rates pursued by the central bank?
The yield curve contains information of use to monetary policymakers, but it
needs to be interpreted in light of judicious subsidiary “identifying” conditions,
together with other data on the economy. Some circumstances lend themselves
to clearer interpretations than others, and there are many pitfalls.
Whether or not one regards longer-term interest rates as economic indi-
cators or as part of the transmission mechanism for policy, or both, the term
structure plays a potentially important role in the policymaking process. In spite
of its complexity, the term structure cannot be ignored.
This article addresses some issues involved in using the term structure
to conduct monetary policy. I begin by discussing the long bond rate as an
indicator of inﬂation expectations. Second, I comment on the role that bond
rates have played in recent U.S. monetary history. Third, I explain how infor-
mation in the yield curve can be used to overcome what I call the “policy in
the pipeline problem.” Fourth, I review recent empirical evidence supporting
the two theoretical views underlying our understanding of the term structure.
I explain how “peso problems” associated with “inﬂation scares” in the bond
market may help to account for a serious empirical failure of the expectations
theory of the term structure. I also discuss evidence supporting the view that
signiﬁcant movements in long-term interest rates are largely driven by expected
inﬂation. Finally, I point out some pitfalls of using the term structure to make
tactical policy decisions.
1. PURSUING LOW INFLATION
The Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, supports a long-
run goal for price stability such that “the expected rate of change of the general
level of prices ceases to be a factor in individual and business decisionmaking.”3
The long bond rate is particularly well suited to help a central bank assess the
degree to which it has achieved low inﬂation deﬁned in that way. One could
compare the behavior of the yield on a long-term nominal bond to its behavior
in a past period in which inﬂation was very low and the public was reasonably
conﬁdent that it would stay low. For instance, in the United States the 30-year
nominal bond rate ranged from around 3 percent to a little over 4 percent
from the mid-1950s until the mid-1960s, a period in which inﬂation averaged
around 1 to 2 percent, and presumably, long-term inﬂation expectations were
no more than that.4 One would think that if the Federal Reserve (the Fed) were
to achieve full credibility for low inﬂation, the long bond rate would once again
move down to the 3 to 4 percent range. Most of the nominal bond yield would
3 Greenspan (1990), p. 6.
4 See Salomon Brothers and Hutzler (1969). Inﬂation as measured by the consumer price
index actually jumped temporarily to the 3 to 4 percent range from 1955 through 1957.      
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then reﬂect an expected real return in the neighborhood of 3 percent.5 Consis-
tently low bond rates would constitute a key piece of evidence that inﬂation
expectations had ceased to be a factor in individual and business decisions.
In addition, we would expect to see bond rates display the kind of indif-
ference to incoming data that they showed in the low-inﬂation period of the
1950s and early ’60s. Long bonds were then one of the most conservative
investments, with stable bond prices and a dependable real return.6 In sharp
contrast, bond prices and ex post real returns became increasingly variable
in the period of high and ﬂuctuating inﬂation and inﬂation expectations. The
variability of returns was also due in part to the increased range of short-term
(real) rates that the Fed had to sustain from time to time in order to bring rising
inﬂation under control.7 For example, both factors were at work when interest
rates peaked in 1981. With inﬂation then above 10 percent per year, long bond
rates were double and bond prices were about half of what they had been in
the mid-1970s.
The Fed succeeded in bringing inﬂation down to 4 percent by 1983 and has
brought it down below 3 percent in the 1990s. Yet long bond rates continued to
be sensitive to incoming data that raised the odds of higher future inﬂation and
Fed action on short rates to head it off.8 Bond rate volatility caused by the 1994
inﬂation scare suggests that the Fed did not then have full credibility for low
inﬂation. Even if actual inﬂation remains low, the low inﬂation goal will not
have been achieved until the United States has low and stable bond rates more
characteristic of the last period in which the Fed had nearly full credibility for
low inﬂation. The one percentage point decline in long bond rates in 1998 to
below 5 percent indicates that the Fed has moved closer to full credibility for
low inﬂation.
The U.S. government recently introduced 5-, 10-, and 30-year index bonds
whose market yields reﬂect an expected real rate of interest over these horizons.
The yield gap between an index bond and the comparable-maturity conventional
(nominal) bond is a direct market estimate of expected inﬂation. Going forward,
the size and stability of the yield gaps will help the Fed assess the extent to
which it has achieved price stability.
5 Theory and evidence both support the view that the expected real return on default-free
long-term nominal bonds varies in a range within a percentage point or so of 3 percent. Quantita-
tive work by Ireland (1996) that ties the ex ante real rate to expected consumption growth, which
varies little over long horizons, suggests that the long real rate should range near 3 percent. And
evidence from U.K. index-linked securities and U.S. index bonds also supports that view.
6 See Ibbotson (1994).
7 See Goodfriend (1993, 1997).
8 See Borio and McCauley (1996) and Gerlach (1996) on the 1994 bond rate volatility.
Compare the 1994 experience to the volatility described in Kessel (1965) and Salomon Brothers
and Hutzler (1969).       
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Preemptive Policy
One of the most important lessons learned by central bankers in recent decades
is that credibility for low inﬂation is the foundation of effective monetary
policy.9 The Fed has acquired credibility since the early 1980s by consistently
taking policy actions to hold inﬂation in check. Experience shows that the
guiding principle for monetary policy is to preempt rising inﬂation. The go-
stop policy experience of the 1960s and ’70s taught that waiting until the public
acknowledges inﬂation to be a problem is to wait too long. At that point, the
higher inﬂation becomes entrenched and must be counteracted by corrective
policy actions more likely to depress economic activity.10
One might wonder why a preemptive strategy should apply more to ﬁghting
inﬂation than to unemployment? The answer is this. A central bank naturally
has more credibility for ﬁghting unemployment when the economy is weak than
for ﬁghting inﬂation when the economy is strong. The reason is that when the
economy is weak, the public applauds an easing of policy because the obvious
beneﬁts in employment come immediately while any costs in higher inﬂation
come later. On the other hand, tightening policy to preempt a rise in inﬂa-
tion invariably draws criticism because the risks of lower employment come
immediately, while the beneﬁt to stabilizing inﬂation is difﬁcult to perceive.
To be preemptive, monetary policy must be forward-looking. That puts a
premium on a forward-looking indicator, especially one that embodies a direct
measure of inﬂation expectations such as a long bond rate. As I will point out
below, the bond rate has not been a particularly good forecaster of changes
in trend inﬂation, and so it certainly needs to be used in conjunction with
other economic indicators. Yet there is evidence that the long-term nominal
bond rate moves primarily as a result of inﬂation expectations. Sharp bond rate
movements ought to be taken as evidence of worsening or improving credibility
on inﬂation, as the case may be, and taken into account in making decisions
on short-term policy.
2. THE ROLE OF BOND RATES: THE U.S. EXPERIENCE
In discussing the role of bond rates in recent U.S. monetary history, I present
three examples of large bond rate movements that probably inﬂuenced policy
actions by signaling sharply changing inﬂation expectations. I also comment
on the fact that longer-term rates often seem to lead short-term rates over the
business cycle.
9 See Goodfriend and King (1997) for a formal justiﬁcation of inﬂation targeting within what
they call the New Neoclassical Synthesis macroeconomic model.
10 See Goodfriend (1997).     
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Inﬂuential Bond Rate Movements
Signiﬁcant bond rate movements probably inﬂuenced the timing and size of
subsequent Fed policy actions on these three occasions.
The February 1980 Inﬂation Scare
After having tightened monetary policy sharply in the fall of 1979, the Fed,
based on evidence of a weakening economy, held short rates relatively steady
in January and February of 1980. Meanwhile, the 30-year bond rate jumped by
2 percentage points between December and February. The inﬂation scare was
primarily the result of three factors: (1) inﬂation as measured by the implicit
price deﬂator was nearly 2 percentage points higher in the ﬁrst quarter of 1980
than in the previous quarter, partly due to the second oil shock; (2) the Soviet
Union’s invasion of Afghanistan destabilized ﬁnancial markets; and (3) the Fed
hesitated with its policy tightening in the face of a weakening economy. The
Fed’s hesitation probably created some doubt about whether the Fed would
hold the line on inﬂation. At any rate, the Fed’s decision to resume its policy
tightening with a huge 3 percentage point increase in the federal funds rate in
March was probably inﬂuenced signiﬁcantly by the sharp prior increase in the
long rate.
The 1984 Inﬂation Scare
The economic recovery from the 1981–82 recession was robust. Real GDP
grew by 5 percent in 1983–84. Although inﬂation was only around 4 percent,
the long bond rate rose from about 10 percent in the summer of 1983 to peak
the following summer at around 14 percent. Amazingly, this was only about 1
percentage point short of its peak in 1981 even though by mid-1984 inﬂation
was 5 or 6 percentage points lower. The Fed raised short-term interest rates in
line with the long rate, and the yield curve remained ﬂat. Although there were
clearly other good reasons to tighten monetary policy at the time, the sharp
rise in the long rate probably contributed to the Fed’s inclination to raise short
rates as much and for as long as it did.
The 1985 Acquisition of Credibility
The Fed held short rates in the 7 to 8 percent range in 1985 and early 1986,
while real GDP grew at 3.3 percent and prices increased at about 3.5 percent.
In early 1986, oil prices moved down from around $28 a barrel to less than
$15 a barrel. Against these developments, the 30-year bond rate declined from
around 12 percent to 7 percent between January 1985 and April 1986, half of
the decline coming before the collapse of oil prices. The huge 5 percentage
point drop in the long rate signaled a big jump in the credibility of the Fed’s
commitment to low inﬂation and probably contributed to the Fed’s inclination
to move short rates down about 2 percentage points in 1986.    
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Does the Fed Follow the Bond Market?
Economists and ﬁnancial market analysts have noted that longer-term rates
have a tendency to lead short rate movements over the business cycle. In other
words, the Fed often appears to follow the market. Some observers argue that
the Fed is obliged to follow longer rates and exerts little independent inﬂuence
of its own. Others recognize that the Fed has considerable discretion over short
rates, but they interpret the evidence as indicating that the Fed follows long
rates because these are taken to indicate the direction the short rates ought to
follow for stabilization purposes. This second view is often accompanied by a
plea that the Fed should not blindly follow the bond market.
In fact, the Fed has considerable discretion to inﬂuence the evolution of
short rates. It moves short rates to stabilize inﬂation and unemployment with
the help of a variety of economic indicators, including bond rates. The Fed
does not automatically follow longer-term rates though. It only appears to do
so at times. The fact that long rates are determined in good part (according
to the expectations theory of the term structure) as the average of expected
future short rates causes the bond market to try to predict future Fed interest
rate policy actions. To the extent that Fed policy contains “systematic follow-
through,” bond rates move ahead of future changes in short rates. On the other
hand, on those occasions when long bond rates jump sharply due to an inﬂation
scare, or fall sharply due to the acquisition of credibility for lower inﬂation,
the Fed might follow with higher or lower short rates, respectively. But the
Fed would only take such policy actions if it interpreted the information in
long rate movements as consistent with other information signaling a sharp
and persistent change in inﬂation expectations.
Bond Market Vigilantes
The forward-looking nature of bond rates has led some commentators to argue
that “bond market vigilantes” are capable on their own of stabilizing the econ-
omy against inﬂation. The argument implies that central banks are now largely
irrelevant. This point makes no sense and is actually quite dangerous. Long
rates often rise ahead of central bank actions because they reﬂect a higher
expected future path of short rates. If a central bank were to disappoint the
bond market by not following through, then bond rates would likely not rise as
much in the next potentially inﬂationary episode. In effect, bond markets are
vigilantes only when they are “trained” to be so by credible anti-inﬂationary
monetary policy.
Bond markets would cease to be vigilantes if the central bank ceased to
follow a credible low-inﬂation policy. In such an environment an increase in
long rates could reﬂect higher inﬂation expectations, i.e., an inﬂation scare.
Rather than acting to restrain spending and inﬂation, an inﬂation scare would
signal a loss of conﬁdence in the central bank’s commitment to low inﬂation.
A central bank might then have to react with a higher path for short-term real      
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rates to hold the line on inﬂation.11 Any way you look at it, bond markets are
not capable on their own of automatically maintaining low inﬂation.
3. POLICY IN THE PIPELINE
It is difﬁcult for a central bank to know when and how much to change short-
term interest rates to hold the line on inﬂation or to resist a recession. In practice,
a central bank moves short rates in steps so it can observe the consequences of
its actions and assess sequentially the need for each incremental rate change.
Policymakers know that it takes some months for the effects of a given change
in rates to be felt by the economy. Policy can cumulate “in the pipeline,” so to
speak, as a sequence of policy actions lengthens. As a tightening proceeds, for
example, central bankers become more cautious about taking further actions
for fear of overdoing it, and creating a recession. Of course, the opposing risk
is that excessive caution might allow inﬂation to rise.
The term structure of interest rates can play a useful role in assessing how
much policy is in the pipeline. If a central bank has credibility as an inﬂation
ﬁghter, then markets may guess correctly that an initial increase in the short
rate is likely to be followed by further increases. The expected future path of
short rates will be built immediately into the term structure of interest rates.
As Dahlquist and Svensson (1996) show, it is possible to extract the expected
sequence of future short rates from the spot rate yield curve; the constructed
sequence of future rates can then be displayed as a corresponding forward
rate curve. Under the assumption of negligible term premia, the forward curve
shows the time path of the market’s expectation of future short-term interest
rates.
Using the forward rate curve, a central bank can see that its initial rate
increase carries with it expectations of a whole sequence of increases. Thus,
not only the ﬁrst rate increase but a whole sequence of projected increases
in short rates is put into the pipeline the moment a series of tightenings is
initiated. Indeed, to the extent that markets begin to expect a sequence of
tightening actions before they begin, policy is put into the pipeline before a
central bank actually raises short-term rates.
To the extent that a central bank’s subsequent interest rate increases were
predicted, they would not constitute new policy impulses. A central bank could
conﬁdently follow through without being deterred by policy in the pipeline.
On the other hand, the central bank could use the forward rate curve to gauge
the extent to which the actual path for short rates departed from the initially
predicted one. It could thereby keep track of new policy impulses it was putting
into the pipeline.
11 See Goodfriend (1993) and Mehra (1997).    
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The above discussion can be made more concrete by reference to the 1994
policy tightening. Campbell (1995) constructs and reports a set of forward rate
curves extracted from the corresponding U.S. spot yield curves at different
dates in 1994. The Fed raised short-term interest rates in a series of seven
steps from 3 percent beginning in early February 1994 to 6 percent in early
February 1995. The ﬁrst point of note is that one-year-ahead forward rates rose
from 3 to 4 percent in early January 1994, indicating that the bond market
expected a signiﬁcant tightening well before it began. Second, just after the
Fed ﬁrst increased the short rate by 25 basis points in February 1994, the
market expected the Fed to raise short rates to 5 percent by early 1995. By
early May 1994 the market was looking for 6 percent short rates in May 1995.
In mid-May 1994, after having moved the spot short rate up to 4.25 percent,
the Fed announced its belief that further policy moves would be unnecessary
in the short term, and the forward rate curve fell, indicating that the market
then expected a May 1995 short rate of around 5.25 percent.
Judging by the behavior of the forward rate curves, it seems fair to say that
the bulk of the Fed’s policy impulses were delivered in three major steps—the
ﬁrst percentage point increase by early January, an additional percentage point
in early February, and a third by early May. The announcement in mid-May
constituted an impulse for easier policy, and so on.
The bottom line is this. Most of the seven federal funds rate policy actions
did not put much new policy into the pipeline at the time that they were
actually taken. The actions merely supported longer-term interest rate increases
that had already happened. Generally speaking, an uncoupling of policy actions
and impulses should be expected to characterize episodes of policy tightening
or easing. Using the term structure to distinguish between actions and impulses
is the ﬁrst step in dealing with the policy in the pipeline problem. Of course, it
will take considerable effort to work out a comprehensive method for dealing
with the problem in practice.
4. EVIDENCE ON THE DETERMINATION OF
BOND RATES
The two theoretical foundations of our understanding of long bond rates, the ex-
pectations theory of the term structure and the Fisher decomposition, have been
extensively assessed on empirical grounds. Some recent work shows how the
monetary policy perspective complements the ﬁnance-theoretic understanding
and interpretion of the behavior of the yield curve.
The Expectations Theory of the Term Structure
Empirical work that tests the expectations theory of the term structure with
U.S. data ﬁnds some unsettling results. Campbell and Shiller (1991, p. 505)  
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summarize the main ﬁndings this way: “The change in the long-term rate does
not behave as predicted—the slope of the term structure almost always gives
a forecast in the wrong direction for the short-term change in the yield [to
maturity] on the long-term bond, but gives a forecast in the right direction for
long-term changes in short rates.” In other words, long rates seem to overreact
to short rates.
We can understand the force of Campbell and Shiller’s comment by re-
viewing the logic behind two key implications of the expectations theory of the
term structure. The ﬁrst implication begins with the idea that, in equilibrium, the
interest rate on a long-term bond must equal the average expected level of short
rates over the relevant horizon (abstracting from a term premium and default
risk). If the long rate were above the expected average of future short rates,
then investors would prefer to hold a long-term bond rather than a sequence of
short-term securities. But that calculation on the part of investors would cause
the bond price to rise until the long-term interest rate fell enough to equate the
expected returns on the two investment strategies. The upshot is that when the
short rate is below the long rate, the expectations theory of the term structure
says that future short rates must be expected to rise, and vice versa. Assuming
that market expectations are formed rationally, the theory predicts that short
rates will actually rise on average in this case or fall if the short rate is above
the long rate. This is the ﬁrst important implication of the expectations theory
of the term structure.
The second implication follows by comparing the expected one-period re-
turn to holding a short-term security with the return of a long-term bond held
for one period. By holding the short-term security, an investor would earn the
short-term interest rate. There is no risk of capital gain or loss on the short
security because it matures after one period. Now consider a long bond that
makes a constant coupon payment each period and matures a few periods in
the future. The one-period return on the long bond has two components. The
ﬁrst component is the coupon divided by the bond price, i.e., the interest yield.
The second component will equal the one-period expected appreciation (or
depreciation, if any) of the bond price divided by the bond purchase price.
Once again, theory tells us that these two one-period returns must be equal
in equilibrium. If the current bond price is such that the one-period interest
return on the long bond is above the short rate, then the market must be ex-
pecting the bond price to fall. Since the coupon payments are ﬁxed, the lower
future bond price, in turn, must imply that the yield to maturity on the long
bond is expected to move still higher (because both the interest and the price
appreciation components of the bond move higher). The upshot here is that
when the short rate is below the long rate, the expectations theory of the term
structure says that long bond returns must be expected to rise. Assuming that
expectations are formed rationally, the theory predicts that the long rate will
actually rise on average when it is higher than the short rate or fall if the short  
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rate is above the long rate. This is the second important implication of the term
structure of interest rates. It is this implication that Campbell and Shiller point
out is not observed in the data. Instead of being followed by a change in the
long-term interest rate in the same direction as the sign of the slope of the yield
curve (long rate minus short rate), the long rate tends to move in the opposite
direction.
Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (1997) offer an explanation for this empir-
ical failure that is driven by small-sample anomalies caused by peso problems
in the data analysis. They explain how the interest rate data could have been
generated by investors who behave according to the expectations theory of
the term structure and form their expectations efﬁciently. Bekaert et al. (1997,
p. 13) explain the peso problem this way: “Suppose that short-term interest
rates can evolve in three different regimes, with the mean and volatility of
rates increasing together as we move across regimes. Further, suppose that
any shock that increases the short-term rate also increases the probability of
switching to a higher-rate regime. Then, as short rates rise, the term spread may
rise as agents rationally forecast a transition to a higher-rate regime. However,
if in a particular sample, the higher-rate regimes are observed less frequently
than their unconditional probabilities, this increase in the spread will appear
unjustiﬁed ex post. Thus, increases in the spread are subsequently followed
by surprising persistence of lower-rate regimes. At the same time, short rates
immediately following the shock will tend to be higher than their unconditional
value even if rates stay within a low-rate regime, since they are highly serially
correlated. This could account for the puzzling ability of the term structure to
predict the direction of short rates but not long-bond returns mentioned above.”
High and volatile interest rates were more common in recent decades in
the United Kingdom than in either Germany or the United States. According to
the peso-problem view, one would expect there to be less evidence against the
expectations hypothesis of the term structure in countries with a sample that is
more representative of the population distribution. Bekaert et al. emphasize that
the evidence supports the peso-problem view since there is only weak evidence
against the expectations hypothesis in U.K. data.
Bekaert et al.’s peso-problem interpretation of U.S. interest rate data ﬁts
nicely with the idea, emphasized in Goodfriend (1993), that the inﬂation-scare
concept helps understand the behavior of bond rates in the United States. To
appreciate the connection, consider this: As Bekaert et al. (1997, p. 2) put it,
underlying the peso-problem interpretation of U.S. data is the idea that the
true “data generating process includes a low probability, usually catastrophic,
state that generates extreme disutility to economic agents. Because the state has
low probability, it is unlikely to be observed in a given small sample of data.
Because it is catastrophic, the possibility that this state may occur substantially
affects agents’ decisions, which in turn determines equilibrium prices and rates
of return. . . . When a peso problem is present, the sample moments calculated      
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from the available data do not coincide with the population moments that agents
actually use when making their decisions.”
Although Bekaert et al. do not mention it, from the inﬂation-scare point
of view the catastrophic state can be interpreted as one with a high trend rate
of inﬂation, perhaps much higher than the 13 percent inﬂation rate the United
States experienced temporarily in the early 1980s. According to the inﬂation-
scare interpretation, long bond rates in the United States jumped sharply on
many occasions, reﬂecting an increased likelihood of a transition to a higher
trend inﬂation state that never materialized because the Fed happened to take
countervailing action to resist it in this small data sample. The bond rate came
down after the inﬂation scares, but future short rates remained higher for a
while because a higher path for short-term real interest rates was needed to
restore credibility for low inﬂation.
The Fisher Decomposition
Irving Fisher (1896) pointed out that a nominal interest rate on a security is
composed of an expected real return and a premium to compensate investors
for inﬂation expected over the life of the security.12 The introduction of index-
linked bonds in the United Kingdom in the early 1980s has by now created a
reasonably long time series of direct evidence on the Fisher decomposition of
nominal bond rates. Barr and Campbell (1997) report the results of an empirical
study of the expected real interest rate and the expected inﬂation components of
the bond rate, assuming that the log version of the pure expectations hypothe-
sis holds. Their major ﬁndings are these. Somewhat surprisingly, short-maturity
nominal bonds are less risky than short-maturity real bonds, but long-maturity
nominal bonds are riskier than long-maturity real bonds. They recognize that
this pattern is explained by the large negative short-run correlation between
real interest and expected inﬂation. At longer horizons this correlation is very
weak and has little effect on the variability of nominal bond returns.
At longer horizons the real interest rate becomes less variable, leaving ex-
pected inﬂation as the dominant factor driving bond returns. Almost 80 percent
of the movement of long-term nominal rates in the United Kingdom appears
to be due to changes in expected long-term inﬂation. The series on expected
inﬂation computed using the indexed and nominal bonds forecasts actual in-
ﬂation better than the nominal bond rates.13 The regressions for short horizons
12 See Ireland (1996) for a modern exposition of Fisher’s idea.
13 Breedon (1995) also reports that medium-term expectations of inﬂation derived from the
U.K. index bonds in conjunction with the nominal bonds predict changes in future inﬂation
reasonably well, though they exhibit a consistent tendency to overpredict future inﬂation itself.
Using the above technique, the Bank of England’s Inﬂation Report for May 1997 reports
that expected inﬂation at ten years fell by about 50 basis points on the announcement of the Bank
of England’s independence.       
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conﬁrm Mishkin’s (1990b) ﬁnding for the United States that the term structure
of six months or less contains no information about the path of future inﬂation.
The above-mentioned ﬁndings indicate that long bond rate movements are
largely driven by expected inﬂation. The ﬁndings support the idea that sharp
long rate movements can be interpreted as indicative of shifts in the credibility
of the central bank’s commitment to low inﬂation. At the same time, although
the expected real interest rate becomes less variable at longer horizons, there
still appears to be room for a central bank to exercise a degree of inﬂuence on
longer-term real rates through its management of short rates. Finally, the large
short-run negative correlation between expected inﬂation and the expected real
rate is consistent with the fact that central banks manage short-term nominal
rates closely and smooth them against shocks. With short nominal rates kept
constant by a central bank, a shock to the inﬂation expectations component of
the rate implies an equal and opposite movement in the expected real rate.
5. PITFALLS IN USING THE TERM STRUCTURE
There are serious pitfalls in using bond rates to gauge the inﬂation risk in the
outlook for the economy, or in gauging the degree to which a series of short-
term interest rate policy actions will be transmitted to the economy through
longer-term interest rates. I discuss these brieﬂy below.
Bond Rate Forecasting Failures
The long bond is arguably a good indicator of the market’s perception of a
central bank’s commitment to low inﬂation. That alone makes signiﬁcant bond
rate movements deserving of the attention of central bankers. A related but
separate question is the extent to which bond rates actually have proven to
be good forecasters of future inﬂation trends. As discussed above, an ongoing
inﬂation trend is reﬂected in higher bond rates. And the term structure does
contain information for forecasting cyclical swings in inﬂation.14 But when it
comes to foreseeing changes in the trend rate of inﬂation, bond rates have not
done as well. For instance, U.S. bond rates did not foresee the big jump in
trend inﬂation that occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Rates did move
up, but only in line with the actual deterioration in current inﬂation.
As another example, consider that the U.S. 30-year rate was roughly in the
same 8 percent range in early 1992 as it was in early 1977, in spite of the fact
that inﬂation was 3 percentage points lower in 1992 than in early 1977. Assum-
ing a real long-term interest rate of around 3 percent, the long-term expected
rate of inﬂation would have been about 5 percent in both years. Apparently,
investors perceived the 6 percent inﬂation rate as temporarily high in early
14 See, for instance, Mishkin (1990a) and references contained therein.      
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1977, and they perceived the 3 percent inﬂation rate in 1992 as temporarily
low. However, the ﬁve years beginning in 1977 saw the worst inﬂation of the
period, and inﬂation has fallen by a percentage point or more since 1992.
Even more spectacular, the fact that the U.S. long rate rose to around 14
percent in the summer of 1984 seems incredible in light of the fact that trend
inﬂation since then has remained around 4 percent or less. Clearly, bond rates
have not always been very good predictors of changes in inﬂation trends.
Policy Actions and Long Rates
The Fed moved short-term rates up by about 3 percentage points from the
spring of 1988 to the spring of 1989, but the 30-year bond rate increased
relatively little, and the yield curve was inverted for most of 1989. In contrast,
the Fed again moved short rates up by 3 percentage points from February 1994
to February 1995. Yet in this latter case the long rate moved up from a trough
of less than 6 percent in October 1993 to peak at over 8 percent in November
of 1994, and the yield curve did not invert.
The two episodes of policy tightening were similar in magnitude and not
far removed in time. Moreover, inﬂation rose only modestly in the late 1980s
and actually held steady at around 3 percent in 1994–95. Yet the behavior of the
long rate differed enormously in the two periods. What should one conclude?
Apparently, the effect of a policy tightening on long rates can differ widely
depending on the circumstances. This suggests that the transmission of a se-
quence of interest rate policy actions to the economy depends on underlying
factors such as the state of the business cycle or the nation’s commitment to
low inﬂation.
An alternative interpretation might be this: In fact, the long rate actually
jumped by 2 percentage points from January to September 1987 just before the
stock market correction. The bond rate registered an inﬂation scare in 1987,
but perhaps the Fed’s response was delayed by the transition from Chairman
Volcker to Chairman Greenspan, which took place in the summer, and later by
the October stock market correction. Under this interpretation a 2 percentage
point bond rate move accompanied a 3 percentage point short rate increase in
both the 1988 and 1994 periods. One might conclude that the only difference
is that the policy tightening associated with the bond rate rise was delayed by
a year in the earlier period.
Even if these two episodes can be seen as reﬂecting similar correlations
between the bond rate and the short rate, is there any reason to expect the
correlation to be stable in the future? Clearly the answer is no. Long rates
varied relatively little with short rates in the low-inﬂation 1950s and ’60s.15
15 See the nice demonstration of this point in Chadha and Ganley (1995), who show that
the correlation between short and long U.K. interest rates in the low-inﬂation 1870–1914 period
is much smaller than in the high-inﬂation 1970–1995 period.      
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Inﬂation expectations were then securely anchored, and the range in which the
Fed varied short rates to stabilize the economy was smaller in the low-inﬂation
period than it was in the 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s. If the Fed succeeds in acquiring
full credibility for low inﬂation in the years to come, then short and long rates
should once again co-vary as in the earlier period. In retrospect, the late 1980s
and mid-1990s may be seen as a transition period in which short and long rates
continued to exhibit the kind of covariation observed in the period of high
inﬂation.
Direct Policy Leverage on the Long Real Rate
Monetary policy transmission is conventionally viewed as running from short-
term real interest rates managed by central banks to longer-term real rates
that inﬂuence aggregate demand. There are two major pitfalls to overcome in
estimating such direct policy leverage on the long real rate. First, as discussed
in the policy in the pipeline section above, one must distinguish policy actions
from policy impulses. Interest rate policy actions that have been anticipated
clearly would not be expected to affect longer-term rates much, if at all. One
should construct and use a sequence of policy impulses in order to gauge the
effect of policy on longer-term rates. Second, when current inﬂation is stable
and inﬂation expectations are well-anchored, then it is reasonable to interpret
the effect of a nominal short rate policy impulse on the nominal long-term rate
in real terms. While those conditions were probably satisﬁed in the 1950s and
early ’60s United States, they probably have not been satisﬁed completely since
then. Actual inﬂation has been well-behaved in the 1990s, but the relatively
large movements in long bond rates suggest that inﬂation expectations are still
not ﬁrmly anchored.
With those caveats in mind, consider some simple evidence on the leverage
that short rate policy actions exert on long rates. Cook and Hahn (1989) found
for the United States in the late 1970s that a 100-basis-point increase in the
Fed’s nominal federal funds rate target increased the nominal 30-year rate by 13
basis points on average. Cook and Hahn used a narrow day or two time window
in their calculations. Two rough calculations in my 1993 paper suggest a larger
25-basis-point effect on the 30-year rate per 100-basis-point short rate policy
action in 1979 and 1980.16 Assuming that both actual inﬂation and inﬂation
16 The sharp 2.3 percentage point federal funds rate rise from September to October 1979
pulled the long bond rate up 0.7 percentage points. And the sharp 8.6 percentage point funds
rate reduction between April and June 1980 pulled the long rate down 1.6 percentage points.
Averaging the two effects yields about 25 percent as the fraction of aggressive funds rate policy
actions transmitted to the long rate. Among all the sequences of aggressive policy actions in the
period I studied, these two seemed the best candidates to gauge the size of direct leverage of
policy over the long rate in real terms. They were very large moves, surprising in their timing
and magnitude. Further, they were taken in only a few weeks’ time when inﬂation and, plausibly,
inﬂation expectations were relatively unchanging. See Goodfriend (1993), p. 13.      
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expectations were relatively unchanging on average when these policy actions
were taken, we can interpret these estimates of policy leverage in real terms.17
Taken as a whole, the year-long episode of policy tightening in 1994 sug-
gests the potential for much greater direct policy leverage over the long real
rate. As mentioned above, the nominal long rate moved about two-thirds as
much as the nominal short rate in 1994. Since inﬂation held steady, the 3
percent increase in nominal short rates was entirely real. The one to two-thirds
leverage, however, should be considered an upper bound on the direct term
structure effect running from real short to real long rates because the long
rate rise almost certainly included an increase in inﬂation expectations as the
inﬂation scare ran its course.
We can say more. As it happened, the 1994 long bond movements in the
United Kingdom paralleled those in the United States: both rose by about 2
percentage points.18 Using the U.K. index bond, Barr and Campbell (1997)
show that the 1994 rise in the U.K. ten-year nominal bond rate was due in
equal parts to a rise in expected inﬂation and a rise in the expected real yield.
Applying a similar decomposition to the rise in the U.S. long rate cuts the
apparent direct leverage of short-term real rates over the long real rate down
to 30 basis points per 100-basis-point short rate action, more in line with the
evidence described above.
It bears repeating that the leverage exerted by short rates over long rates
is regime dependent. Policy leverage will depend on the market’s expectation
of what a given central bank policy action implies for the expected path of
future short rates. For the 1970s period in the United States examined by Cook
and Hahn, the Fed was not yet in a full-ﬂedged inﬂation-ﬁghting regime. That
might explain why the leverage found by Cook and Hahn is smaller than for
the early 1980s or for 1994. Moreover, one might think that policy leverage
in the 1950s was relatively weak too, since policy actions needed to stabilize
the economy were relatively small and of short duration.19 The point is that
17 A change in the central bank’s short rate target can itself convey information that simul-
taneously inﬂuences long-run inﬂation expectations one way or the other. Markets could become
more concerned about future inﬂation because the central bank has revealed its concern; or mar-
kets could feel more conﬁdent of price stability because the central bank is taking action against
inﬂation. The statement in the text assumes that these two effects cancel each other. Clearly, this
question needs to be addressed in a more sophisticated way, controlling explicitly for changes in
expected inﬂation, perhaps using index-bond market data.
18 See Borio and McCauley (1996).
19 An important point to keep in mind is that a given short-rate policy action will exert a
greater effect on the long rate the shorter the average life of the bond as measured by its duration.
The duration of a coupon bond may be thought of as the term to maturity of an equivalent zero
coupon bond that makes the same total payments and has the same yield. The duration of a very
long-term bond selling near par is approximately 1/r, where r is the per-annum yield to maturity.
The duration of the 30-year bond, for instance, is only about 12 years at an interest rate of 8
percent, but it rises to 33 years at a 3 percent interest rate. Other things the same, policy leverage     
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relatively aggressive short rate actions are required to restore credibility for
low inﬂation after it has been compromised, whereas policy actions taken to
maintain credibility for low inﬂation can be quite modest.
6. SUMMARY
The term structure of interest rates can play an important role in the making
of monetary policy. Long rates indicate the extent to which a central bank has
achieved price stability. Signiﬁcant bond rate movements inﬂuence the timing
and magnitude of monetary policy actions. On the other hand, the ability of
bond rates to forecast changes in inﬂation trends is not particularly good. More-
over, the inﬂuence of policy actions on longer-term rates can be quite variable.
In particular, the degree of restraint transmitted by policy is difﬁcult to manage
in a transition between high- and low-inﬂation regimes. The effect of policy
on the economy becomes more predictable once low inﬂation is secure.
The peso-problem interpretation of some anomalies in the empirical assess-
ment of the expectations hypothesis literature squares nicely with the inﬂation-
scare interpretation of sharp movements in bond rates. Recent empirical ﬁndings
on the Fisher decomposition of nominal bond rates also accord well with the
inﬂuence of inﬂation scares and central bank interest rate smoothing on interest
rates.
Some points about the use of the term structure for making tactical policy
decisions are worth reiterating: (1) the need for policy to preempt a rise in
inﬂation and inﬂation expectations puts a premium on the long bond rate as
an indicator of credibility for low inﬂation; (2) policy leverage on long rates
is regime dependent and, in particular, will vary with a central bank’s com-
mitment to price stability and its credibility for low inﬂation; (3) policy often
follows long rates because long rates embody expectations of future short rate
policy actions and because long rate movements often signal changing inﬂation
expectations that may precipitate a policy reaction; (4) bond market vigilantes
do not make central banks irrelevant; and (5) the yield curve can be employed
usefully to distinguish policy actions from policy impulses in order to tell how
much policy is in the pipeline.
The alert reader may have noticed that I have not discussed how the term
structure might help a central bank forecast the risk of recession. There is
a literature showing that term spreads are useful for predicting recessions as
much as two years ahead. Bernard and Gerlach (1996) document the evidence
for eight countries over two decades. While this ﬁnding seems robust, it is
of less use to central banks than one might think. The reason, as Bernard
over longer-term rates will be much smaller at low interest rates such as those observed in the
1950s and early ’60s.    
M. Goodfriend: Term Structure of Interest Rates 29
and Gerlach recognize, is that over this sample period most recessions follow
periods in which central banks have tightened monetary policy to ﬁght inﬂation.
A term spread that is inverted by a deliberate tightening of monetary policy
may contain little additional information of use to central bankers.
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